Introduction
This paper analyses an oligopoly with a price discrimination constraint on only one …rm. We label this as an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint. An asymmetric no-discrimination constraint occurs in practice in both regulatory and competition policy contexts and is typically imposed on a …rm with signi…cant market power.
In a regulatory context such no-discrimination constraints are often imposed on former state monopolists. The objective is to encourage entry after liberalisation, by prohibiting selective rebates by the incumbent for customers that switched to entrants. Another objective is the protection of certain groups of customers that still do not have a choice after liberalisation, by prohibiting the incumbent to selectively charge higher prices for only those groups. In this respect, regulators impose a universal service obligation on the incumbent that may take the form of a uniform pricing constraint across its monopoly and competitive segments. Examples of regulatory asymmetric no-discrimination constraints include the energy regulator in the United Kingdom, Ofgem, which investigated customer win-back pricing strategies by the former incumbent, London Electricity, following a complaint by an entrant. 1 Another example concerns the gas sector in the United Kingdom. The incumbent British Gas was not allowed to price discriminate between customers with dual-fuel equipment that had alternatives to gas and customers that had not. 2 Asymmetric no-discrimination constraints are also imposed in a competition policy context. 2 on contested shipping routes, while continuing higher prices for uncontested services, was an abuse. In Irish Sugar, the European Court of First Instance judged several price discrimination practices by Irish Sugar to establish abuse of dominance, including selective rebates to customers of a French sugar importer, "sugar export rebates"to industrial customers that exported outside
Ireland and "border rebates"to customers close to the border with Northern Ireland that could purchase sugar cheaper from the United Kingdom.
In fact, two di¤erent price discrimination practices occur in these examples taken from regulation and competition policy. First, a …rm with signi…cant market power applies behaviourbased price discrimination within the competitive segment when it selectively targets customers that switched to entrants in order to win them back. Second, third-degree price discrimination is practiced when a …rm with signi…cant market power sets di¤erent prices across its competitive and monopolistic segments. This paper analyses an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint which is a combined constraint of price discrimination within a competitive segment (behaviourbased) and across the monopolistic and competitive segments (third-degree) that applies only to the …rm with signi…cant market power.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in various ways. First, while the existing price discrimination literature mainly studies the consequences of changing all …rms'pricing strategies in a symmetric way, our focus is on the consequences of limiting the pricing strategies of one …rm only. In particular, we study the welfare consequences when only one …rm must commit to uniform pricing for regulatory reasons (e.g. a universal service obligation) or competition purposes (e.g. abuse of dominance), while the competitor's pricing mode is left unconstrained. Second, our model studies how the competitive e¤ects of an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint within a competitive segment (i) alter when the constraint also applies across competitive and monopolistic segments, and (ii) change with the size of the monopolistic segment. We show that an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint on the …rm with signi…cant market power enhances welfare as long as its monopoly segment is not too large. Third, we highlight that interaction between a static (third-degree) and dynamic (behaviour-based) form of price discrimination may result in opposing policy conclusions. In particular, while a no-discrimination constraint in a static analysis suggests that competitition may be augmented if the entrant must still decide on entry, a dynamic framework may result in less entry. More generally, our analysis contributes to the competition policy and regulation literature as it shows that the combination of two instruments (a no-discrimination constraint within and across segments) may lead to outcomes that are unintended by each instrument separately.
We consider a model with a monopolistic and competitive segment in the spirit of Armstrong and Vickers (1993) , with two periods and strategic interaction in the competitive segment. When the dominant …rm can set its prices unrestrainedly, it practices third-degree price discrimination by charging the monopoly price in its monopolistic segment. The dominant …rm competes with its rival on the competitive segment in uniform prices in the …rst period and practices, as in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) behaviour-based price discrimination in the second period.
We study the competitive and welfare e¤ects when there is an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint imposed on the …rm that serves the monopolistic and the competitive segment, while the other …rm serving only the competitive segment is left unrestrained.
Our two-period analysis yields the following results as compared to the benchmark model where both …rms can set prices unrestrainedly. First, both …rms' pro…ts su¤er most from the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint when the size of the monopolistic segment is small. An asymmetric no-discrimination constraint within the competitive segment results in lower prices to both …rms, whereas an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint across segments shifts prices upwards. These two forces a¤ect the unrestrained …rm's pro…ts in the following way. When the monopoly segment is large enough, the pro…t-increasing e¤ect of the asymmetric (thirddegree) no-discrimination constraint across segments outweighs the pro…t-decreasing e¤ect of the asymmetric (behaviour-based) no-discrimination constraint within the competitive segment.
The pro…ts of the dominant …rm, however, augment when the e¤ect of the asymmetric nodiscrimination constraint in the competitive segment (i.e. the behaviour-based constraint) is less pronounced. Second, from a welfare perspective we …nd that the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint increases total welfare and consumer welfare whenever the monopolistic segment is not too large and entry is pro…table.
The literature on oligopolistic price discrimination mainly addresses the welfare implications when all …rms either engage in price discrimination or have symmetric pricing constraints; see e.g. Chen (1997 , 2009 ), Taylor (2003 , Villas-Boas (1999) , and Armstrong (2006 Armstrong ( , 2008 and Stole (2007) for reviews. Yet, only few papers study the implications of asymmetric restrictions on price discrimination.
An important paper which does study an asymmetric price discrimination constraint is Armstrong and Vickers (1993) . They consider the competitive and welfare e¤ects of a ban for the dominant …rm on third-degree price discrimination. In their one-period model, the dominant …rm serves a monopolistic segment and competes in prices with a price-taking entrant on the remaining competitive segment. They …nd that an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint across 4 segments decreases the price in the monopolistic segment while, given entry, the price rises in the competitive segment. With this asymmetric no-discrimination constraint, the incumbent monopolist protects its monopolistic segment and, consequently, responds less aggressively to entry. The results of our dynamic two-period model lead to conclusions that may contradict those from a static, one-period model. Our two-period analysis shows that when the monopoly segment is not too large, competition intensi…es when the dominant …rm faces an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint, so that both …rms obtain less pro…t. In other words, when the monopoly segment is not too large, the pro…t-increasing e¤ect of the no-discrimination constraint across segments is dominated by the pro…t-decreasing e¤ect within the competitive segment. Consumer welfare then increases with the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint not only because more consumers pay lower prices, but also because more consumers are served by their nearby provider. However, when the size of the monopoly segment increases, our results become more in line with the static framework. That is, average prices increase with the size of the monopolistic segment, and eventually result in higher average prices in the competitive segment when its size becomes su¢ ciently large.
Another paper which is closely related to our contribution is Chen (2009) , who uses three variants of a dynamic model to study behaviour-based price discrimination between competing …rms. In his model, an incumbent has a monopoly position in the monopolistic segment and competes in prices for consumers with a more e¢ cient …rm in the competitive segment. Firms can engage in behaviour-based price discrimination by observing consumers' purchase history.
Chen's model shows that uniform pricing weakens competition while it is su¢ cient for price discrimination to enhance long-run consumer welfare when the more e¢ cient …rm in the competitive segment does not exit as a result of the incumbent's pricing strategy. Our analysis and …ndings di¤er in two respects. First, our model studies the e¤ects on competition when there is an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint, while the other …rm is left unconstrained. In Chen's model, a ban restricts both …rms'pricing strategies. In contrast, our modeling allows to study the asymmetric treatment of a dominant …rm by a regulatory body or competition authority.
Second, we show that an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint may intensify competition when the size of the monopolistic segment is not too large, and consequently, may enhance consumer welfare only when the rival …rm remains in the market. Gehrig et al. (2010) consider that the entrant has no customer information and therefore, cannot discriminate between customers. The incumbent, in contrast, has consumer information and can discriminate between loyal and other customers. They …nd that the entry possibilities do not hinge on the incumbent's possibility to price discriminate on the basis of history-based pricing. However, the price level is higher when the incumbent makes use of price discrimination as opposed to uniform pricing. Our set-up, however, di¤ers since our approach endogenizes …rst-period competition, and therefore, takes into account intertemporal price competition. Furthermore, we also consider a (third-degree) no-discrimination constraint across segments, linking the competitive and monopolistic segments served by the incumbent. Valletti et al. (2002) study the relationship between entry and a universal service obligation that takes the form of a uniform pricing constraint. In their static model, they look at the strategic e¤ects of a uniform pricing and coverage constraint on hitherto unrelated markets.
The uniform pricing constraint in their model is only binding for the incumbent who serves markets with di¤erent characteristics whereas the entrants are only active in markets with identical customers. In our model, a pricing constraint on all …rms would result in uniform pricing in both periods.
Finally, our model has similarities with Pazgal and Soberman (2008) . They consider whether …rms want to adopt behaviour-based discrimination in an environment where …rms can (i) commit whether or not to price discriminate and (ii) o¤er additional bene…ts to their past consumers in the second period. They …nd that when the bene…ts that …rms can give to customers are identical, behaviour-based discrimination generally leads to lower pro…ts for both …rms. When …rms di¤er substantially in providing second-period bene…ts, the best response of the …rm providing the lowest second-period bene…ts sometimes is to set a uniform price and avoid behaviour-based pricing. Our analysis di¤ers in three important aspects. First, we assume that a …rm only can commit not to practice price discrimination when it faces regulatory restrictions. These restrictions are asymmetric as they restrict the best response of one …rm only. When unrestricted, …rms cannot commit to forego price discrimination. We believe that lack of commitment is often more realistic; in particular, when consumers know they are easily recognized by …rms, it remains di¢ cult for sellers to commit not to use their customer information for price setting purposes. Second, in our setting, the impact of an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint within the competitive segment hinges on whether price discrimination across segments is allowed or not. When not allowed, customers of the restrained …rm anticipate additional "harm" when they buy from that …rm in the second period: they anticipate higher prices as a result of the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint. In other words, the asymmetric payo¤s assumed in Pazgal and Soberman (2008) result in our case from an asymmetric restriction across segments.
The size of the monopolistic segment determines the impact of this asymmetry. Third, in our 6 setting, we have the interesting feature that an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint across segments links unrelated segments and creates an asymmetry in payo¤s. The total impact of this restriction is driven by pro…t both on the competitive and monopolistic segment.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model where …rms can price freely. In Section 3 we analyze competitive behaviour with an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint. This allows us to study regulatory and competition policy issues.
Section 4 o¤ers a welfare comparison while Section 5 concludes.
The benchmark model
Two pro…t-maximizing …rms, A and B, compete in prices on a Hotelling unit interval, with
A located at 0 and B at 1. They compete during two periods and set prices in each period.
Their marginal production costs are constant and normalized to zero. Consumers are distributed uniformly on this competitive segment, have inelastic and unit demand in each period, and incur transportation costs t per unit of distance. Their willingness to pay is su¢ ciently high to cover the market and they have …xed preferences over time. Firms and consumers discount the future at a common rate 0 1. Both …rms charge a uniform price p i 1 in the …rst period, where i = A; B. Our benchmark model closely follows Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) where …rms can distinguish in period two their …rst-period customers from their rival's. Customer recognition at the …rm level across the two periods, therefore, o¤ers both …rms the possibility in period two to engage in behaviour-based price discrimination. In addition to their model, …rm A also enjoys a monopolistic segment where consumers have a willingess to pay w. The mass of the competitive segment is normalized to 1 while the mass of the monopolistic segment equals a.
Firm A serves its entire monopolistic segment and charges a price w in both periods. Accordingly, its total discounted pro…ts in the monopolistic segment (denoted by subscript m)
Consider the competitive segment. Starting the analysis with second-period competition, assume that, without of loss of generality, …rst-period competition results in …rm A serving customers who are located "to the left of x" and …rm B serving customers "to the right of x", with 0 x 1. There are two indi¤erent consumers in the second period. The …rst indi¤erent consumer is at 0 x and satis…es
where p ij 2 refers to a price charged in the second period to a consumer who purchased from …rm i in period 1 and from …rm j in period 2, with i = A; B and j = A; B. The second indi¤erent consumer is at x 1 and satis…es
Firm A maximizes its second-period pro…ts in the competitive segment (subscript c)
whereas …rm B maximizes
Both …rms now have two best-responses; one for each part of the competitive segment they serve. Firm A's …rst best-response function satis…es p AA Turning to …rst-period competition, the forward-looking …rst-period indi¤erent consumer in the competitive segment is located at x such that
where p i 1 is …rm i's …rst-period price, with i = A; B. Firm A maximizes its total discounted pro…t
in the competitive segment, whereas …rm B maximizes
From the …rst-order conditions, equilibrium prices amount to
4 Firm B's best responses are symmetric, i.e. p 
8
As Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) have shown, consumers rationally anticipate that a price decrease today will result in a higher price tomorrow. As a result, …rst-period prices are higher than in a static model because consumers' demand is less price elastic. In equilibrium, both …rms equally share the competitive segment and enjoy identical pro…ts in that segment. In the second period, one third of the consumers in the competitive segment switch supplier since = 1=3 and = 2=3. From a total welfare perspective, consumers ine¢ ciently switch provider.
Since …rms poach each other's …rst-period customers, second-period prices are so much lower so that overall pro…ts decrease. The discounted pro…ts for both …rms in the competitive segment amount to Sections 3 and 4 o¤er the competitive and welfare e¤ects of an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint imposed on one …rm only, i.e. …rm A. Since …rm A is active on a monopolistic and competitive segment, general competition law or regulatory constraints may impose such a nodiscrimination constraint on …rm A. Firm B, in contrast, is free to charge its customers di¤erent prices at any moment. The asymmetric no-discrimination constraint imposes on …rm A (i) to not price discriminate within the competitive segment (between prior customers and customers from the other …rm) and (ii) to not price discriminate across segments (the monopoly segment and the competitive segment). When the size of the monopolistic segment is zero, the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint coincides with no discrimination within the competitive segment only. For larger sizes of the monopolistic segment, the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint also imposes no discrimination across segments. 5 Competition law typically applies when a …rm has signi…cant market power which implies in our setup a su¢ ciently large monopolistic segment.
Regulatory constraints, in contrast, may apply for di¤erent sizes of the monopolistic segment.
We assume throughout our analysis that the constrained …rm A …nds it always pro…table to 5 In Section 4, we brie ‡y turn to the welfare implications of a restriction that imposes a no-discrimination constraint between segments but allows for price discrimination within the competitive segment. However, in case of a universal service obligation, no-discrimination constraints are typically observed either within a competitive segment or both within and across segments. Our welfare results will show that such a constraint would generally lead to lower welfare. This may explain the observed practice of universal service obligations either within competitive segments or within and across segments. 9 serve its monopolistic segment, to remain active in the competitive segment, and poach some of its rival's customers in the second period.
3 Asymmetric no-discrimination constraint: competitive e¤ects An asymmetric no-discrimination constraint implies that …rm A can neither engage in behaviourbased price discrimination within the competitive segment, nor third-degree price discriminate across its monopolistic segment and the competitive segment. Although …rm A can charge di¤erent prices across both periods, it must charge a uniform price within each period. In other words, …rm A has a no-discrimination constraint and must charge e p A 1 in period one and e p A 2 in period two to all its customers, where "e " is used to denote the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint. In contrast, …rm B practices behaviour-based discrimination. Clearly, such an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint introduces a link between the monopolistic segment and the competitive segment when the size of the monopolistic segment is strictly positive. and is lower than the benchmark model since we assumed that A preferred to charge w to all its customers in the benchmark model.
We now …rst provide our analysis in a general way, and discuss the two forces leading to di¤erential prices compared to the benchmark model. Afterwards we discuss how an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint within the competitive segment generates competitive e¤ects and how adding an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint across the competitive and monopolistic segment impacts competition. We further link our …ndings with competition law and regulatory issues.
Starting from period two, suppose …rst-period competition has led …rm A to serve all consumers to the left of e x in the competitive segment, and …rm B to serve all consumers to the right of e x. In the second period, there are two indi¤erent consumers. The …rst is located at 0 e e x and is characterized by
while the second indi¤erent consumer located at e x e 1 is characterized by The best-responses look likep By making use of the best-reply curves of Figure 1 , we illustrate the forces that explain the di¤erences with our benchmark model. (Figure 1 illustrates a situation for a equal to zero.)
Second-period pro…t maximization leads to best-reply curves which now depend on a andx. We explain the intuition behind these equilibrium prices by distinguishing two e¤ects -a commitment e¤ect and price sensitivity e¤ect. First consider the commitment e¤ect. Observe that e p A 1 > e p B 1 . If the indi¤erent consumer e x opts for …rm B in period 1, she expects to be poached in the next period by …rm A at a price e p A 2 . Firm A's poaching price is rather high as A must charge an identical price to its …rst-period customers in the competitive and the monopolistic segment. If, however, the indi¤erent consumer visits …rm A in the …rst-period, she anticipates a more attractive second-period poaching price by …rm B since e p AB 2 < e p A 2 . Firm A is therefore regarded as an unattractive poacher because it is committed to charge a high poaching price. This forces …rm B to charge a lower price than A in period 1 and allows …rm A to extract more surplus from its …rst-period customers. This commitment e¤ ect explains the di¤erences between the prices charged. We also observe that both prices e p A 1 and e p B 1 are increasing in a, although e p A 1 depends much stronger on the size of the monopolistic segment. An asymmetric no-discrimination constraint implies that all prices in the competitive segment increase in a, indicating that the degree of competition depends on the size of the monopolistic segment.
Second, there is also a price sensitivity e¤ect. The price levels with the asymmetric nodiscrimination constraint di¤er from the benchmark model. A price sensitivity comparison of the marginal consumer between the benchmark model and asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is useful to explain the di¤erent price levels. We start with our benchmark model for the competitive segment. As in Fudenberg and Tirole's (2000) set-up, …rst-period demand increases with when …rm A decreases its …rst-period price by a small amount ". The marginal consumer is now located at x = 0:5 + , where measures the marginal consumer's sensitivity to this price change. Accordingly, substitution of the second-period prices, and simplifying 6 , results in 6 Following Armstrong (2006), we solve Clearly, the marginal consumer is less sensitive to a …rst-period price change than in the static Hotelling model (see Armstrong, 2006a ) -indeed, in a static model, where = 0; we …nd that = "=2t. The reasoning is that she now weighs o¤ two alternatives. On the one hand, if the marginal consumer decides to buy from …rm A, he enjoys a …rst-period price cut of one unit by …rm A but su¤ers in the next period since …rm B's second-period poaching price increases in at rate 4t=3. On the other hand, when he decides to buy from …rm B, he does not enjoy the price cut today but will enjoy a lower price in the next period as …rm A's second-period poaching price decreases in at rate 4t=3. The total e¤ect as re ‡ected by the value of results in a lower price sensitivity of demand compared to the static Hotelling model, and coincides with a model in which neither …rm practices behaviour-based discrimination. We now turn to the case with an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint where we can compute~ as follows.
When …rm A changes its …rst-period price slightly top A
1
, it follows after simpli…cation 7 that satis…es~ = " 2t(1 5 =12) :
While the marginal consumer again weighs o¤ two similar alternatives as before, we …nd that an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint results in more price-sensitive consumer behavior than the static or unconstrained benchmark model. This stems from the following forces. If the marginal consumer decides to buy from …rm A, he enjoys a …rst-period price cut of one unit by …rm A. In the next period, he now only incurs a small increase in price as …rm B's second-period poaching price increases by 5t=6 in only. However, when he decides to buy from …rm B, he does not enjoy the price cut today but will enjoy a lower price in the next period as …rm A's second-period poaching price which decreases in at rate t=3. Thus the indirect e¤ects on the poaching prices make the demand more elastic, re ‡ected in the value of , as compared to the static Hotelling model or the unconstrained benchmark model. This price sensitivity e¤ ect explains the di¤erence of the price level between the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint and the benchmark model. 7 The indi¤erent consumer is characterized byp
(5(e x + ) + 2a 1) + t(e x )) = We now interpret the e¤ects of an asymmetric no-discrimination contraints on competition.
Consider …rst a situation where the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint only applies within the competitive segment (i.e. the size of the monopolistic segment is zero). Overall competition for both …rms is now keener than in the benchmark case: the commitment e¤ect induces …rm B to price more aggressively in the …rst period and the price sensitivity e¤ect makes …rst period 8 This result should not be seen as contradicting Thisse and Vives (1988) . They show that a …rm has a pro…t incentive to engage in price discrimination whenever its rival makes use of a uniform pricing strategy. From this reasoning, …rm B should perform better than …rm A. The following two elements explain however why …rm B performs worse. First, the no-discrimination constraint imposed on …rm A makes it an unattractive poacher in period 2. This commitment e¤ect forces …rm B to charge a lower price than A in the …rst period. Since both …rms serve half of the market, …rm B performs worse in period 1. Second, …rm B cannot commit not to price discriminate in the second period. In line with Thisse and Vives (1988) , …rm B …nds it optimal to charge two
since …rm B's pro…ts are lower.when charging only one price in period 2. Firm B's pro…ts, however, su¤er more from the commitment e¤ect and explain its worse performance.
demand more elastic. Next, we add an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint across segments by considering a positive size for the monopolistic segment, and evaluate it for varying size of a.
For low enough a, overall competition for both …rms is still keener than in the benchmark case.
However, for a high enough a, competition on the competitive segment becomes less severe so that B's pro…ts are higher than in the benchmark model. That is, …rm B enjoys higher overall pro…ts with an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint since …rm A now su¢ ciently weakens its competitive response. Firm A's pro…ts su¤er from the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint when is not too small. Intuitively, when is small (i.e. close to zero), our setup approaches a static analysis: …rm A then may increase its pro…ts from being able to commit to non-discrimination for at least some range of a (as in Armstrong and Vickers (1993) ).
Our discussion above is summarized in Result 1.
Result 1.
Compared to the benchmark model, an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint leads to (i) …rms' joint pro…ts to increase if and only if the monopolistic segment is su¢ ciently large; (ii) …rm A's pro…ts to decrease for not too small; and (iii) …rm B's pro…ts to increase if and only if the monopolistic segment is large enough.
Proof: See Appendix.
Asymmetric no-discrimination constraint: welfare analysis
We now study how an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint impacts welfare on the competitive segment. We make a distinction between total welfare and consumer welfare. Total welfare in our setting is determined by frictions, i.e. transportation costs. Consumer welfare, however, also takes into account prices incurred by consumers. Results for both total welfare and consumer welfare hinge on the size of the monopolistic segment. We therefore start our discussion by considering a small monopolistic segment a. To identify forces, take a to be zero.
This implies that the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is only a prohibition to not price discriminate by …rm A within the competitive segment. With a equal to zero, the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint provides greater total welfare and consumer welfare compared to the benchmark model. These results stems from two complementary forces. First, the restriction improves the second-period allocation of consumers as fewer consumers visit their non-nearby provider, whereas the …rst-period allocation is identical to our benchmark model. The asymmetric no-discrimination constraint, therefore, results in a higher total welfare. Second, overall competition with the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is greater than when …rms can set prices unrestrainedly. Consumer welfare is therefore higher with the no-discrimination constraint as both prices and frictions incurred by consumers are lower.
Consider now the forces when the size of the monopolistic segment becomes positive and increases further. That is consider the situation where one adds a no-discrimination constraint across segments -monopolistic and competitive segments to the no-discrimination constraint within the competitive segment. As long as a is small, total welfare and consumer welfare are higher with the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint: the negative welfare impacts of the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint across segments does not dominate the positive welfare e¤ects of an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint within the competitive segment.
However, a large monopolistic segment increases prices and stimulates ine¢ cient travelling in the competitive segment. This leads to lower consumer welfare and total welfare. Consumer welfare and total welfare become lower than in the benchmark model when a becomes large. The asymmetric no-discrimination constraint then is mainly driven by its across market segments impact, and therefore dampens competition in the competitive segment and induces …rm B to enjoy larger pro…ts than in the benchmark model. Therefore the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint generates redistributive e¤ects: it favours consumers in the monopolistic segment by introducing competition at the expense of consumers in the competitive segment where competition decreases. Furthermore, it stimulates the impact of frictions as more consumers visit their non-nearby supplier, leading to lower total welfare. Finally, an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint unambiguously increases consumer surplus in the monopolistic segment.
The above discussion on consumer and total welfare is summarized in result 2.
Result 2. Compare the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint to the benchmark model with unrestricted pricing and consider the competitive segment. We …nd that (i) the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint strictly increases total welfare as long as the size of the monopolistic segment is not too large; otherwise total welfare is higher in the benchmark model, and (ii) the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint strictly increases consumer welfare as long as the size of the monopolistic segment is not too large; otherwise the benchmark model yields higher consumer welfare.
Proof: See Appendix 4.
We now compare this result to Armstrong and Vickers (1993) and further discuss what would happen if entry were modelled. Armstrong and Vickers (1993) have shown that in a static model, an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint weakens competition and reduces welfare on the competitive segment if the entrant is already in the market. In our model, we have shown the opposite when the monopoly segment is small enough: (i) the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint reduces all …rms'pro…ts (Result 1), and (ii) the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint leads to greater social welfare (Result 2). This stands in strong contrast with the Armstrong and Vickers result. However, when the monopoly segment is more important to …rm A, all …rms'pro…ts increase from an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint and the Armstrong and
Vickers results reappear in our setting. In other words, when the monopoly segment is small enough, the e¤ect of an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint within the competitive segment (i.e., a dynamic behaviour-based price discrimination constraint) outweighs the e¤ects from an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint across segments (i.e., a static third-degree price discrimination constraint). The opposite results holds when the monopoly segment is su¢ ciently important. Armstrong and Vickers (1993) also notice that when the entrant must still decide to enter, an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint may be pro-competitive when absent such a constraint, keener competition results in preventing pro…table entry. A no-discrimination constraint may then serve as an entry-enhancing and pro-competitive policy measure. Our analysis has shown that this entry-enhancing feature of an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint only carries over to our setting when the size of the monopolistic segment is su¢ ciently large as then the entrant's pro…ts increase. However, when the size of the monopolistic segment is small and the entrant's pro…ts decrease, an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint may result in …rm B not entering the market, leaving …rm A with a monopoly. Summing up, if entry were costly, the probability of entry might be lower in the presence of an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint as …rm B might not be able to recover the …xed cost of entry. Whether ex ante welfare would be greater with or without such an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint depends therefore on the size of the monopoly segment.
We conclude the welfare section by discussing the welfare implications of an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint which would apply only across market segments but not within the competitive segment. In other words, poaching within the competitive segment would be allowed but …rm A would need to charge the same price to its loyal customers on the competitive segment and its customers on the monopolistic segment. From a welfare perspective, such a nodiscrimination constraint is dominated by an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint within the competitive segment and across segments. Total welfare and consumer welfare are lower when the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint only applies across market segments compared to when it also applies within the competitive segment. This may explain why an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint across market segments but not within the competitive segment is not observed. This is in line with the actual practice of universal service obligation restrictions where a no-discrimination constraint applies …rst within market segments, or applies both within and across market segments.
Conclusion and policy implications
This paper has analysed the competitive and welfare e¤ects of an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint. A regulator or competition authority typically imposes such a constraint in an oligopoly only on the one …rm with signi…cant market power. In our model the …rm with signi…cant market power is the only …rm serving a certain part of the market (the monopolistic segment), whilst facing competition on another part (the competitive segment). In a regulatory context this …rm can be the former state monopolist after the market has been liberalised and competition has been introduced in part of the market. In a competition policy context this …rm can be a dominant …rm that may abuse its position by applying price discrimination.
The asymmetric no-discrimination constraint that we have studied prohibits both behaviourbased price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. These forms of price discrimination are often observed in a regulatory and competition policy context, judging by actual regulatory measures and by case law. The policy justi…cations for the constraint include the prevention of competition-reducing exclusionary strategies by dominant …rms, the protection of certain customer groups that face no choice of supplier and that risk paying excessively high prices, and the encouragement of entry by weakening the price responses to entrants by the incumbent.
Our main …ndings and their policy implications are as follows. First, an asymmetric nodiscrimination constraint is only welfare-enhancing if the monopolistic segment is not too large.
For a competition authority with the objective to optimize total or consumer welfare this implies the following. In the case of "super-dominance", where the monopolistic segment is very large relative to the competitive segment, imposing an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint on the dominant …rm does not improve welfare. Only in circumstances of weak dominance does the constraint enhance welfare.
Whilst most competition authorities are interested mainly in optimising total and consumer welfare, regulators often pro-actively encourage entry to create more competition. We …nd that an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint only leads to higher pro…ts for the entrant if the monopolistic segment is large enough. Practically this implies that the policy objective of encouraging entry is not served by the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint if the monopolistic segment is small relative to the competitive segment. In recently liberalised sectors the incumbent typically has a relatively large monopolistic segment; in these circumstances the constraint imposed by the regulator does encourage entry. In later stages after liberalisation, however, once the competitive segment has become large relative to the monopolistic segment, the asymmetric constraint e¤ectively reduces the further growth of entrants.
Appendix
In order to have an internal solution where …rm A is active both on its own …rst-period turf and on …rm B's …rst-period turf, we need to have that 0 < e < e x < e < 1. The most stringent condition is that e > 0 which is satis…ed whenever a < 54 31 52 27
a max . So we will assume that the monopolistic segment is always su¢ ciently small, i.e. smaller than a max such that …rm A is active also on its …rst-period turf of the competitive segment.
Proof of Result 1:
(i) De…ne the di¤erence in …rms'joint pro…ts on the competitive segment between the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint and the benchmark model as 
The function
A+B is quadratic in a, and A+B = 0 whenever a = fa 1 ; a 2 g with 0 < a 1 < a max < a 2 . Moreover since A+B j a=0 = 77 t=144 < 0 and @ 2 A+B =@a 2 < 0, …rms'joint pro…ts on the competitive segment increase whenever a 1 < a < a max .
(ii) De…ne the di¤erence in …rm A's pro…ts on the competitive segment between the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint and the benchmark model as For lower values of , the impact of the asymmetric ban on …rm A's pro…ts hinges on the size of a.
(iii) De…ne the di¤erence in …rm B's pro…ts on the competitive segment between the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint and the benchmark model as B is quadratic in a, @ 2 B =@a 2 > 0, and B = 0 whenever a = fa 1B ; a 2B g with 20 a 1B < 0 < a 2B < a max . Since B j a=0 = 43 t=144 < 0 and @ B =@a j 0 a a 2B 0, we have that B > 0 for all a 2B < a < a max .
Proof of Result 2
Consider …rst the result regarding total welfare which is part (i) of the result. We focus on the non-…nancial outlays, i.e. ine¢ ciencies stemming from transportation costs, to discuss total welfare. The lower the non-…nancial outlays, the higher total welfare. Non-…nancial outlays in the benchmark model are As we can see, the non-…nancial outlays under uniform pricing obligation are quadratic in the size of the monopolistic segment a. It is easy to show that for a = 0, the non-…nancial outlays in the benchmark model are higher than for the uniform pricing obligation. The two equations above become identical to each other when a = a 1 ;where a 1 is the highest root which makes these two equations identical. (The lowest root is negative and therefore not relevant.) Notice that a 1 is smaller than a max . In sum, we therefore have shown that for 0 a < a 1 total welfare is strictly higher under the uniform pricing obligation. For a 1 a a max , total welfare is higher under the benchmark model.
Consider now consumer surplus which is part (ii) of our Result. To address the issue of consumer surplus, we compare total outlays on the competitive segment -…nancial outlays and non-…nancial outlays. This boils down to the sum of the non-…nancial outlays and the …rms pro…ts on the competitive segment.
Start with the benchmark model. Firms'pro…ts on the competitive segment are Adding this to the non-…nancial outlays of Total outlays for the uniform pricing obligation are the sum of these …nancial outlays and the previously mentioned non-…nancial outlays.
Evaluated for a = 0, we …nd that the total outlays for the benchmark model are larger than those for the uniform pricing obligation since the di¤erence between the two models then equals t(61 + 120) 96 :
Furthermore, evaluated for a = 0 we …nd that total outlays increase in a for the model with uniform pricing whereas they are constant for the benchmark model. More general (i.e. for all admissible values of a < a max ) we have that the total outlays for the two models are identical when a = a 2 , with a 2 < a max . Again the second root for which the total outlays are identical lies outside the relevant range. We therefore have shown that for 0 a < a 2 consumer welfare is strictly higher under the uniform pricing obligation. For a 2 a a max , consumer welfare is higher under the benchmark model. Finally, we …nd that a 1 a 2 if is low whereas a 2 a 1 otherwise. 
